Chidozie Douglas Acholonu
Nigeria’s insurgents have moved from machetes and roadside bombs to the sky. Over the last two years Islamist groups in the northeast and violent gangs in the northwest and north-central have started using commercially available drones for surveillance, propaganda and increasingly for attacks. That shift is not a marginal technicality. It widens the battlespace, lowers the threshold for lethal strikes, and exposes critical gaps in Nigeria’s current approach, which still leans heavily on larger, state-style drones and airpower supplied from abroad. It’s time for a different strategy: small, local, expeditionary FPV (first-person view) drone units organized on the Ukrainian model of rapid-innovation, cheap-lethality, and decentralised operations.
What the insurgents are already doing
Recent reporting and analysis show jihadist groups operating in the Lake Chad Basin and beyond are using uncrewed aerial systems for intelligence, target acquisition and direct attack. ISWAP and allied factions have used drones to reconnoitre positions, film operations for propaganda, and in some cases to deliver explosives, tactics that multiply the effectiveness of small, mobile cells and increase the danger to troops and civilians alike. Meanwhile, violent “bandit” gangs in the northwest have begun using drones to surveil villages, identify targets for ambush, and coordinate complex raids. These are not isolated anecdotes but a growing pattern across the country’s violence hotspots.
Why Nigeria’s current drone posture is limited
Nigeria has bought larger, Turkish-made tactical drones and has used state airpower in counter-insurgency strikes. Those platforms bring range, ordnance-delivery and prestige, but also high cost, complex logistics, and political constraints that limit rapid, localised response. Larger systems are valuable, but they are poor tools for the granular, time-sensitive fights that dominate Nigeria’s conflict: clearing a forest ambush, protecting a convoy, interdicting kidnap-for-ransom teams, or supporting village defence. The insurgents’ drone use shows the problem: cheap, commercial systems in many hands can outpace a slow, centralized procurement-and-deploy model.
What Ukraine proves and what we can adapt
Ukraine has transformed the modern battlefield by turning low-cost FPV and “kamikaze” drones into a decisive asymmetric tool. Small teams, minimal supply chains, and rapid local manufacture have allowed Ukrainian units to strike armoured vehicles, disrupt logistics, and deny territory to a conventionally superior force. Those lessons are not an imported checkbox; they are a template for a different way to fight insurgency in Nigeria: decentralised, low-cost, fast-iterating, and driven by front-line units and local industry. FPV drones excel at short-range precision strikes, rapid reconnaissance in complex terrain, and providing dismounted troops with a force-multiplier that’s hard to detect and even harder for large aircraft to counter quickly.
A practical roadmap for Nigeia
Below is a realistic, phased plan to build Ukrainian-style FPV drone capability suited to Nigeria’s realities.
1. Create modular FPV platoons inside existing army and police battalions
Train small teams (6–12 personnel) in flying, maintenance, tactical employment, and legal/ethical constraints.
Embed FPV squads with local infantry companies and mobile police units so they can be task-organised quickly.
2. Localise procurement and manufacture
Prioritise off-the-shelf airframes and open-source navigation/flight controllers to keep costs down. Support Nigerian tech firms and universities to assemble, modify and repair kits, creating a domestic supply chain and jobs.
3. Build a nimble tactics-development hub
Establish a permanent “drone lab” that collects lessons from the field, prototypes modifications (PL payloads, fibre-optic control where EW is strong, nets/counters), and rapidly distributes tactics to platoons.
Partner with Ukrainian and NATO trainers for knowledge transfer, but adapt to Nigerian terrain and rules of engagement.
4. Integrate legal, ethical and civil-protection frameworks
Define clear ROE to avoid civilian harm, and oversight channels so strikes and recon don’t become unaccountable. Use drones first for ISR and precision interdiction reserve lethal FPV strikes for high-value, time-sensitive targets with positive ID.
5. Harden defences and non-kinetic counters
Invest in short-range counters: drone nets, small-arms paired with optical trackers, rapid jamming where appropriate, and small mobile radars. But recognise insurgents will innovate (fibre-optic drones, mesh control) so counters must be layered and adaptive.
Why this matters politically and operationally
A decentralised FPV approach solves three problems at once: it gives local commanders a rapid, affordable means to see and strike; it reduces dependence on slow state procurement and foreign suppliers; and it creates an adaptive culture that can respond to insurgents who already use cheap drones. Done poorly, drone programmes risk human rights abuses and mission creep; done right, they can protect civilians, deny insurgents sanctuary, and re-establish mobility for security forces across the northwest, north-central and northeast.
Call to action next steps for policymakers and practitioners
Defence and internal security ministries should pilot three FPV platoons in the next 90 days embedded with units operating in Borno, Zamfara and Plateau states.
Fund a national drone lab (public–private) to standardise training, maintenance and ethical oversight.
Launch an immediate partnership with Ukrainian FPV trainers and selected NATO advisors for a 6-month exchange program.
Ensure parliamentary oversight and transparent public reporting on drone operations to avoid misuse.
Conclusion
The drone revolution is already here, and Nigeria cannot afford to treat it as a novelty. Insurgent groups have shown they can and will use cheap aerial systems to magnify their reach. The right answer is not just bigger, more expensive drones; it’s smarter, faster, and more local: modular FPV units, local manufacture and a learning-first approach inspired by Ukraine’s experience. Done correctly, these measures will deny insurgents the air advantage, restore initiative to local forces, and save lives.
