By Babade Victor Temijope
Over the past four years, Africa has witnessed a dramatic resurgence of military coups—an unsettling reversal after two decades of democratic progress. From to , , , and most recently , soldiers are once again stepping out of the barracks and into presidential palaces.
This new wave of coups raises urgent questions: Why are military takeovers returning? Why are citizens in some countries even celebrating them? And what does this trend mean for Africa’s political future?
Between 2020 and 2024, at least nine successful or attempted coups occurred across the continent—the highest number in a generation. The political climate feels eerily reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s, when post-independence instability created fertile ground for military interference.
Democratic Fatigue and Public Disillusionment
Frustration has become widespread. Many African citizens—especially the youth—believe democracy has not delivered the prosperity and security they were promised. Corruption, weak institutions, unemployment, and insecurity have created deep disillusionment.
In countries like Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, crowds even cheered as soldiers ousted their leaders. This reflects a difficult truth: in many places, democracy has lost credibility—not because people reject it in principle, but because they believe it has been poorly practiced.
The Guinea-Bissau Controversy
The reported military takeover in Guinea-Bissau on November 26, 2025, has deepened concerns about a renewed era of coups. However, the situation remains controversial.
Nigeria’s former president, , alleged that President stage-managed the military action to avoid losing a presidential election, describing it as a “ceremonial coup” and demanding that election results be announced.
In response, the (ECOWAS) suspended Guinea-Bissau from its decision-making bodies during an emergency meeting of its Mediation and Security Council, expressing deep concern over the unfolding political crisis.
Insecurity and Governance Failures
Across the Sahel and parts of Central Africa, violent extremism, banditry, and insurgency have spread faster than governments can respond. Civilian administrations are widely perceived as weak, dependent on foreign forces, and unable to protect lives or territory.
The military often frames its intervention as a corrective measure: if politicians cannot defend the nation, the armed forces must step in. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, coups were explicitly justified as responses to governments’ inability to defeat jihadist groups.
Economic Crisis and Social Pressure
Africa’s recent coups are also unfolding amid rising poverty, debt burdens, food insecurity, and inflation—exacerbated by COVID-19, global economic shocks, and climate stress. When living conditions deteriorate and governments appear disconnected from popular suffering, the social contract begins to collapse.
In such environments, the military—often better organized and less immediately affected by economic turmoil—can emerge as an alternative center of power.
Weak Institutions and Personalized Power
In many states, institutions revolve around individuals rather than rules. Courts, parliaments, and electoral bodies lack independence. This institutional fragility makes it easier for the military to intervene and harder for societies to resist once they do.
Regional and International Signals
The international response to coups has been inconsistent. While ECOWAS and the often impose sanctions, such measures sometimes hurt civilians more than coup leaders. Over time, military rulers may conclude that international condemnation is temporary and manageable.
Shifting global alliances have also provided alternative diplomatic and economic partners for coup regimes, reducing their isolation.
ECOWAS Chairman and Ghanaian President warned at a regional summit that coups had become “contagious” and must be contained before devastating the entire region.
The “Coup Trap”
History suggests that once coups begin, they tend to multiply. Scholars describe this pattern as the “coup trap.”
Sudan offers a telling example. Between 1958 and 1971, the country experienced 11 failed, thwarted, or completed coups. Four plots—one successful and three thwarted—occurred in 1969 alone.
According to a December 2021 analysis by on the blog, coups often create more instability than they resolve. When military officers overthrow a democratically elected government, they frequently struggle to establish legitimacy, increasing the risk of further plots and counter-coups.
A Deeper Crisis of Governance
The renewed wave of military coups in Africa is less a sudden return to militarism than a warning sign of a deeper crisis of governance. These takeovers reflect widespread frustration with civilian governments that have failed to deliver security, economic stability, accountability, and inclusive leadership.
Where democratic institutions are weak, power is personalized, and citizens feel excluded from decision-making, the military finds both the opportunity and the justification to intervene.
The long-term solution, therefore, lies not in simply condemning coups, but in rebuilding credible democratic systems—strengthening institutions, restoring public trust, and delivering tangible improvements in citizens’ lives. Only then can Africa break free from the cycle of instability and safeguard its democratic future.
