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Chinese Miners Are Not the Architects of Nigeria’s Banditry: A Response to Farooq A. Kperogi

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By Dr Austin Maho

A recent article published by Farooq A. Kperogi in his syndicated weekly column, titled “How Chinese Miners Fuel Nigeria’s Terrorist Banditry”, raises an urgent question: What is the nexus between illegal mining and  Nigeria’s security challenges?

It is a discussion Nigerians must have.  However, going through the article, it quickly narrows into a familiar pattern:  “Chinese miners fuel banditry”. The evidence cited does not support that causal leap. Worse, the framing obscures the real drivers of violence, ignores Chinese victims of the same crisis, and recycles a geopolitical cliche that paints Chinese investment as uniquely predatory. Nigerians deserve to know the truth, not create a foreign bogeyman to wish away a national crisis.

Blaming “Chinese miners” oversimplifies a complex crisis and risks xenophobic scapegoating of innocent foreigners.

1: Illegal mining is a symptom, not the disease. Banditry predates Chinese presence. Kperogi himself concedes that “illegal mining is not the sole driver of Nigeria’s insecurity.” That caveat should be the headline, not a footnote. Banditry in Zamfara exploded between 2011 and 2014, long before Chinese-linked companies became visible in the area. The 2019 Zamfara mining ban was imposed because bandit attacks were already rampant, not the other way around.

The roots are well documented: decades of state neglect, collapsed agricultural livelihoods, farmer-herder clashes exacerbated by climate stress, proliferation of small arms after Libya’s collapse, and the hollowing out of traditional conflict-resolution systems. In Niger State’s Shiroro LGA, communities were displaced by terrorists like Dogo Gide and ISWAP  before any foreign company showed up. Mining did not create the terror. Terror created ungoverned space, and all kinds of actors, local and foreign criminals, rushed into the vacuum.

To say Chinese miners “fuel” banditry reverses cause and effect. As Engr. Adamu Garba Musa asked: “If bandits are disturbing people, how come the company is working successfully?” The answer is grim but obvious: companies survive by paying what villagers cannot – protection levies, extortion, coercion, shakedown or their investments go up in flames. This is not sponsorship. Conflating the two criminalises victims of coercion.

2: Chinese nationals are victims, not masterminds, of kidnapping and banditry. If Chinese-linked firms were financing bandits, why are Chinese citizens routinely kidnapped by those same bandits? The record is public:

-June 2022:  Four Chinese workers abducted for ransom at a mining site in Shiroro, Niger State.

-January 2023: Two  Chinese nationals kidnapped in Ogun State. One police officer killed during the attack.

-October 2023:  Three  Chinese expatriates taken in Osun State; millions allegedly paid for release.

-March 2024:  A Chinese engineer abducted in Zamfara. Local police confirmed bandits demanded N100m.

August 2025: 2. Two  Chinese miners killed in Kaduna when bandits attacked their site.

These are not isolated. The Chinese Embassy in Abuja has repeatedly issued security alerts and, in February 2026, called allegations of terror financing “completely baseless” while reaffirming “zero tolerance”  policy toward its companies or citizens engaging in illegal mining abroad. It urged Chinese firms operating in Nigeria to strictly comply with Nigerian laws and regulations, and said the Chinese government supports legal enforcement by the Nigerian government against any individual or entity found violating those laws.

The statement also pushed back on narratives linking Chinese miners to banditry, noting that Chinese citizens have themselves been frequent victims of kidnapping and violent attacks at mining sites across Nigeria. The embassy called for objective, fact-based reporting rather than generalisations that stigmatise foreign investors. It reaffirmed China’s commitment to working with Nigerian authorities to promote lawful, orderly mining cooperation and to jointly safeguard security, adding that Beijing is willing to cooperate with Nigerian investigations and take action against any Chinese nationals proven to be involved in illegal activities.

No businessman kidnaps his own assets. The pattern is clear: Chinese firms, like Nigerian ones, operate in high-risk zones because minerals are there. They hire security, pay levies under duress, and sometimes lose staff. That makes them victims of state failure, not authors of it.

3: Narrowing it down to the  “Chinese”  label hides a Nigerian problem: elite complicity and regulatory failure. Every credible report Kperogi cites names the same prime mover: “politically connected Nigerians.” Dr. Maurice Ogbonnaya’s ISS work indicts  “politically connected Nigerians”. The ENACT brief blames “Nigerians in high positions of authority”. The WikkiTimes investigation references licenses held by  Nigerian companies, Eso Terra Investment Limited and Majelo Global Resources Limited.

In Nigeria’s mining sector, foreigners cannot hold titles directly. They partner with Nigerian license holders, who handle community relations, security, and politics. When WikkiTimes reports that “bandits were paid N3 million every week”, the question is: who negotiated that? Who knew the Dogo Gide faction’s account number?  The fixers, facilitators, and profit-sharers are Nigerian. Chinese are mainly hired hands in the mines to provide their technical expertise and financing. Yet the headline becomes “Chinese Miners.” This is how structural corruption is laundered into ethnic outsourcing. We fire the cook and keep the menu.

4: “80 illegal” does not equal “80% Chinese”. The NEITI/ANEEJ report cited by Reuters says 80% of mining in the Northwest is illegal. It does not say 80% is Chinese. Artisanal and small-scale mining in Nigeria employs 500,000+ Nigerians, per the Ministry of Solid Minerals. They dig without licenses, sell to middlemen, and pay local chiefs. Chinese buyers are part of a long chain that includes Lebanese, Indian, Nigerian, and Togolese traders. Singling out one nationality distorts the narrative and leads to ethnic profiling.

Moreover, the same ministry Kperogi credits for reform has licensed Chinese firms that do operate legally.  Examples abound: Segilola Gold in Osun, Ganfeng Lithium in Nasarawa, and others are publicly listed, pay taxes,  royalties, and publish ESG reports. In February 2026, the ministry announced 388 new mineral buying centres to formalise trade. Many Chinese buyers have registered. The government’s own data shows a move toward compliance, not a conspiracy.

5: The geopolitical context: Who benefits when “China” is the villain? Kperogi’s piece lands in a crowded media ecosystem where “China in Africa” is shorthand for exploitation. Western outlets have run dozens of stories on Chinese illegal mining in Ghana, Zimbabwe, and DRC. Some are factual; many are thinly sourced. The pattern is to frame China as a unitary actor – “China” mines, “China” bribes, “China” funds terror – while Western firms are “companies” and Nigerian elites are “collaborators.”

That framing has costs. In 2023, a viral rumor that “Chinese miners were arming bandits” triggered attacks on Chinese workers in Zamfara. In 2024, the House of Reps had to debunk claims that Chinese firms were importing weapons. Narrative has body counts. Nigeria should not be a proxy in great-power competition. Our security analysis must be evidence-led, not geopolitics-led. If a Canadian or Australian firm paid bandits to access a site, we would call it what it is: corporate criminality under duress. We would not indict Canada.

6: What a serious policy response looks like – without xenophobia. Kperogi ends with six proposals. Most are sound. But they will fail if built on a faulty diagnosis. Here’s a refined version:

-Map the entire value chain, not just the foreign face.  Publish beneficial owners, yes, including Nigerian PEPs. Name the local chiefs who collect surface rents, the DSS officers who escort minerals, and the customs agents who clear containers.

-Traceability must be nationality blind. Blockchain or paper, the standard should apply to every buyer: Chinese, Lebanese, Nigerian. The 388 buying centres are a start. Expand them.

-Prosecute the extorted and the extorter differently. A company that reports bandit levies to the NSA should be treated as a witness, not a sponsor. Create a safe harbour for firms that disclose payments under duress. That dries up terror financing faster than arrests.

-Secure mines the way we secure oil facilities. The reason bandits don’t tax oil fields is the Joint Task Force. The Mining Marshals arresting 350+ people is progress. Scale it, and embed military cover for legal sites.

-Diplomacy, not demagoguery.  China has leverage over its nationals. In 2024, Beijing blacklisted 3 firms caught in Ghana’s galamsey. Nigeria should give the Chinese Embassy a docket of allegations and demand action. Public shaming without due process just drives illegality underground.

-Fix the livelihood crisis.  Banditry pays because farming doesn’t. No amount of mining reform will work if 70% of Zamfara youth are jobless. Formalize artisanal miners into cooperatives, as Alake suggests. Give them equipment, not just arrests.

Nigeria’s minerals should be a blessing. Today they are a curse. But the curse is not Mandarin. It is impunity. It is the governor who takes a cut, the general who sells a license, the chief who rents his forest, and the bandit who taxes everyone.

Chinese firms that break the law should face the law. So should Nigerian firms. So should the officials who enable them. But to suggest that “Chinese miners fuel banditry” is to substitute a slogan for a strategy. It tells villagers in Shiroro that their enemy is a foreigner, not the governance void that left them defenceless.

Many Chinese nationals have been kidnapped, killed, and extorted in this crisis. They want what Nigerians want: roads without ambushes, sites without levies, contracts without bribes. An enabling environment for legal business is not a Chinese demand. It is a Nigerian right.

We should listen to Prof. Tade Aina and dig deeper. But let’s dig for the truth, not for a scapegoat. Banditry will end when the Nigerian state returns,  with laws, with force, and with legitimacy. No embassy, East or West, can do that for us.

Dr Austin Maho is  a member of the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE) and publisher of Daybreak Nigeria

Opinion

NAHCON’s New Hajj Guidelines Signal Shift Towards Tighter Regulation

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By Ibrahim Muhammad

The introduction of new licensing and operational guidelines by the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) signals a broader push to strengthen regulation of private Hajj and Umrah operators and improve accountability, service delivery and consumer protection.

The reforms come amid similar regulatory efforts in countries including Pakistan and Indonesia, where authorities have introduced stricter licensing, financial controls and operational requirements for private pilgrimage operators.

The guidelines are expected to address concerns over service standards, financial transparency and the activities of unlicensed operators in Nigeria’s Hajj and Umrah industry. In Pakistan, recent reforms require private Hajj operators to meet financial and corporate governance standards, undergo performance reviews and operate through a central digital platform for pilgrim registration, payments and quota management.

The framework also requires operators to meet minimum operational thresholds and comply with service agreements covering areas such as accommodation, transportation, medical support, refunds and consumer protection. Indonesia, meanwhile, requires private Hajj operators to obtain regulatory approval for proposed package costs and meet government standards on pricing and service delivery.

These developments point to a wider shift towards digital accountability, financial transparency and stronger oversight of private pilgrimage services. As NAHCON implements its new framework, stakeholders will be watching to see whether it improves service delivery, curbs unlicensed operations, promotes fair competition and creates a more sustainable environment for legitimate Hajj and Umrah operators.

Ibrahim Muhammad is the National Coordinator of Independence Hajj Reporters (IHR).

Part Two will examine the reforms and their implications for Nigeria’s private Hajj and Umrah industry.

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Opinion

Insecurity and 2027: Can Nigerians Vote Safely?

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By Shemudara Blessing Morayo

As Nigeria prepares for the 2027 general elections, concerns about insecurity have become central to discussions about democratic governance. Elections provide citizens with the opportunity to choose their leaders through a free, fair and credible process. However, the ability of Nigerians to exercise this constitutional right depends largely on whether voters, electoral officials and security personnel can participate without fear of violence or intimidation.

Nigeria’s security challenges have become increasingly complex over the past decade. The country continues to face insurgency in the North-East, banditry and kidnapping in the North-West, farmer-herder conflicts in parts of the North-Central, separatist agitations and attacks on public institutions in the South-East, as well as piracy, militancy and other criminal activities in the Niger Delta. Rising urban crime also poses challenges in several major cities.These overlapping threats have displaced communities, disrupted livelihoods and strained the capacity of security agencies. In some areas, insecurity has also affected education, healthcare and civic participation, raising concerns about the organisation of peaceful elections.

Electoral violence has historically been a recurring feature of Nigeria’s democratic experience. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, some elections have been marred by voter intimidation, destruction of electoral materials, attacks on polling units and clashes between political supporters.

Although reforms by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), including the use of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and electronic transmission of results, have strengthened aspects of the electoral process, technology alone cannot guarantee peaceful elections. Security remains fundamental to electoral credibility.One major concern ahead of 2027 is voter turnout. Citizens in conflict-affected communities may be reluctant to visit polling centres because of fears of attacks, kidnapping or violent confrontations. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have also faced difficulties exercising their voting rights after being forced from their communities.

If insecurity persists, significant numbers of eligible voters could be unable or unwilling to participate, potentially affecting the inclusiveness and legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Democracy depends on broad participation, and any situation that discourages citizens from voting poses a threat to democratic consolidation.

The safety of electoral officials is another critical concern. Election administrators, ad hoc staff and logistics personnel are responsible for transporting sensitive materials and conducting elections across thousands of polling units. Insecurity can make these activities particularly difficult in remote and conflict-prone areas.

Delays, cancellations or suspension of voting in affected communities could increase political tensions and fuel allegations of voter suppression or electoral manipulation. This makes effective security planning essential. Political actors must also play their part. The use of armed groups, political thugs and criminal networks during election periods has historically contributed to violence. Hate speech, misinformation and inflammatory rhetoric can further deepen political divisions.

As political campaigns for the 2027 elections intensify, political parties and candidates must adhere to electoral laws, respect democratic norms and discourage their supporters from engaging in violence. Peaceful elections require not only effective security institutions but also responsible political leadership.The role of security agencies will be decisive. The Nigeria Police Force, Armed Forces, Department of State Services, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and other relevant institutions must work together to protect voters, electoral personnel and infrastructure before, during and after the elections. Their responsibilities should include intelligence gathering, threat assessment, crowd management and the protection of electoral facilities.

Professionalism, impartiality and respect for human rights will also be essential to maintaining public confidence in security operations. INEC must equally strengthen collaboration with security agencies and other stakeholders. Early risk assessments, contingency planning and sustained engagement with local communities can help reduce vulnerabilities in areas prone to violence.

Civil society organisations, religious leaders, traditional rulers, youth groups and the media also have important roles to play. Through voter education, peacebuilding, fact-checking and responsible reporting, these stakeholders can help counter misinformation and encourage peaceful participation.Technology presents both opportunities and challenges for election security. While digital innovations have improved aspects of voter accreditation and result management, social media platforms can also facilitate the rapid spread of misinformation and inflammatory content.

Unverified information circulating during elections can create panic and trigger unrest, particularly in communities already affected by insecurity. Government institutions, civil society organisations and technology companies should therefore promote digital literacy, fact-checking and responsible online engagement while respecting freedom of expression.

Whether Nigerians can vote safely in 2027 will ultimately depend on the willingness of all stakeholders to address insecurity proactively. Security agencies need adequate funding, training, equipment and intelligence capabilities to respond effectively to evolving threats.

Political leaders must prioritise national stability over partisan interests, while citizens should reject electoral violence and demand accountability from those seeking public office. Beyond election security, long-term investments in good governance, education, youth employment, poverty reduction and justice sector reforms are also necessary to address some of the structural conditions that contribute to insecurity.

Insecurity remains one of the major threats to Nigeria’s democratic future as the country approaches the 2027 general elections. However, the challenges are not insurmountable.Through coordinated security operations, credible electoral administration, responsible political conduct, active civic participation and sustained institutional reforms, Nigeria can create an environment where citizens are able to participate freely and safely in the democratic process.

The success of the 2027 elections should not be measured solely by the declaration of winners. It should also be judged by the extent to which eligible Nigerians can exercise their right to vote without fear. Ensuring electoral security is therefore not merely a security objective; it is a democratic imperative that will shape Nigeria’s political stability and democratic legitimacy for years to come.

Shemudara Blessing Morayo is a graduate of Veritas University, Bwari, Abuja, and is currently serving as a National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) member at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). She can be reached at [shemudarablessing2002@gmail.com](mailto:shemudarablessing2002@gmail.com).

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ACF: We’ve Northerners Who Are Igbos- Prof. Muh’d- Baba Reveals

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…As forum recounts real reasons in crisis

…Alleges leadership control, administrative mistakes, others

By Kaduna Correspondent

As the raging disputes in the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the socio-cultural umbrella organization of northern Nigeria, has continue to deepened, allegations of leadership control tussle, administrative breaches, and mismanagement of about ₦4 billion endowment fund, amongst other reasons, have been enumerated.In this interview with our Kaduna State Correspondent, Gabriel Udeh, the National Publicity Secretary of the ACF, Prof. Tukur Muhammad-Baba, a retired professor of sociology, broke silence on the internal wrangling that recently led to the sealing of the Forum’s headquarters by police in kaduna.

Prof. Muhammad-Baba traced the crisis to attempts to usurp the powers of the National Executive Committee (NEC), disputes over tenure, and violation of the ACF constitution in the management of the Fund. He also spoke on the status of the suspended Board of Trustees Chairman, Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, and the Forum’s position on insecurity in the North. Excerpts:

Q: Let’s know you fully and your position Sir?

A: Okay, I am Tukur Muhammad-Baba. I am a retired university lecturer. I am a scholar for life. That is, I am a professor of sociology. I was the former dean of the Faculty of Social and Management Sciences at the Federal University of Technology, Minna, among others, just before I retired. But basically, I am Tukur Muhammad-Baba. Currently, National Publicity Secretary of the Arewa Consultative Forum. I am a scholar by calling and a sociologist. Thank you so much.

Q: ACF is one of the most respected organizations in Nigeria. There are serious concerns about the recent crisis that went viral and led to police invasion. What are the real reasons ACF is neck deep in this crisis?

A: ACF is a foremost socio-cultural organization in the country. One reason it has retained credibility is because it is not ethnic-based, not religious-based. It’s political, but not partisan. We consult among various groups in the north to come up with a platform of common interest – roads, education, economic development. The north has over 300 ethnic groups. We are united by geography and sociology. For example, in Benue and in Kogi states, we have northerners who are Igbo. In Kwara state, we have northerners who are Yoruba. They are indigenous to the area. But like every modern organization, conflict is inevitable. It is how you handle disagreement that defines the organization. We’ve had personality differences over the years. If you ask me to summarize, the bone of contention is not so much ACF, it’s control of the ACF. Unprecedentedly, individuals emerged and want to control this organization in their own image. During the 25th anniversary, we launched an endowment fund for the first time because we realized there was too much political interference with governors’ contributions. The target was ₦100 billion. Pledges were about ₦7 billion, out of which a little less than ₦4 billion was generated.

Q: What exactly went wrong with the management of that fund?

A: The constitution is clear. There are five organs: Patrons, General Assembly, Board of Trustees, NEC, and NWC. NEC and NWC are the management. BoT is to advise and oversee. There has been a persistent attempt to usurp NEC’s powers by a functionary of BoT, in particular the then chairman, who assumed functions outside the constitution. The fund was moved out of Kaduna, against the constitution which says management must be at the head office. It was moved to a financial institution in Kano offering 8%. We had institutions offering 20% and 21%. By our calculation, we would have earned about ₦113 million in three months at 21%, but at 8% we earned just over ₦17 million. We also discovered part of the money was moved from one bank branch to another where an individual had a personal account, without EXCO approval, without the financial secretary or treasurer.

Q: There is also the issue of tenure of officers and leadership. What happened?

A: The constitution says the Secretary-General serves three years, renewable once. In 2023 there was a lacuna of 6-9 months with no NWC. The ex-Secretary-General continued. His letter of appointment for the second term said tenure begins from inauguration. But BoT said no, he had overstayed. Legal experts said the interim period cannot count. NEC was sidelined. We read in the papers that the SG was asked to go. Nobody wrote to NEC. The Leadership Selection Committee, which is ad hoc, had been in place for nine years. We told them they stood dissolved. They refused

.Q: The crisis led to the headquarters being sealed by police. How did that happen?

A: Disagreement over interpretation led some to invite police to seal the headquarters. It had never happened before. I told the media: when the police get bored of staying at the gate, they will leave. And within 10 days, they left. EXCO had to meet elsewhere. The chairman of BoT also intervened and said nobody should come to the meeting, but he has no power to do that under the constitution.

Q: What about Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, the BoT Chairman? Is he still in office?

A: A petition was received that he was interfering in functions not his, moving money, and directing staff. The Code of Conduct Committee invited him. He refused to appear. The committee recommended suspension and forensic audit. EXCO endorsed it. Bashir Dalhatu was suspended as a member of ACF. By implication, he cannot be BoT Chairman because only a member can hold that position. The BoT should have appointed a new chairman. He has continued to act as if he is CEO. As of now, Bashir Dalhatu is not a member of ACF. He is a suspended member. Any action he takes as chairman is null and void.

Q: Some people are calling it fraud. Is it fraud or administrative mistake?

A: Fraud can only be established by proper investigation. It is under investigation. There is a forensic review going on. The Code of Conduct and Ethics Committee is still waiting to hear from those accused. What I can say now is there have been serious administrative lapses that violate the ACF Constitution. The money shouldn’t have been moved. The organization is losing money by keeping it at 8% instead of 20%. Whether there is fraud or not will be established after investigations.

Q: What is ACF’s position on the rising insecurity in the North?

A: Government seems more interested in politics than security. The most existential threat to Nigeria is insecurity: kidnapping, banditry, rape, inter-communal clashes. It’s not a question of capacity. Our armed forces are trained in the best military colleges worldwide. We think it’s a question of political will. Governors are chief security officers but have no control over police or military deployment. That’s a serious lacuna. We are also not in support of amnesty without accountability. You cannot have your sister raped and government surrenders your right to justice. We must decapitate these criminals and their enablers.

Q: Are there efforts to resolve the crisis?

A: Yes. Elders are intervening. Lawyers have submitted legal positions. We are hoping it will be resolved soon because the North needs to articulate its position within Nigeria. When we are united, ACF has been impactful. We reviewed the four tax bills and 80% of our recommendations were reflected. We galvanized opposition to military intervention in Niger Republic and to foreign military bases in Nigeria. Our position is simple:let everybody abide by the provisions of the constitution.

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