Connect with us

Opinion

Faith, Fear and Forests: Understanding the Ideological and Criminal Dimensions of Insecurity in Nigeria’s Education Sector

Published

on

By Shemudara Blessing Morayo

Education is often described as the foundation of national development, yet in Nigeria, schools have increasingly become targets of violence. Over the last decade, attacks on educational institutions have transformed from isolated incidents into a persistent national crisis. Thousands of students have been displaced, hundreds of schools have been closed, and countless families now live with the fear that sending their children to school could place them in danger.

This crisis is driven by two distinct but interconnected forces: ideological extremism and criminal opportunism. Together, these forces have turned schools into battlegrounds and transformed education from a pathway to opportunity into a source of anxiety for many communities.The ideological dimension of school attacks in Nigeria is closely associated with Boko Haram, an extremist group that emerged in the early 2000s.

The group’s name is commonly interpreted as “Western education is forbidden,” reflecting its belief that secular education undermines Islamic values and traditions. To Boko Haram, schools are not merely buildings where children learn; they are symbols of a cultural and religious system the group seeks to reject. Schools that promote Western curricula, mixed-gender learning environments, or perceived Christian influence are viewed as threats to the society the group hopes to create.

For this reason, educational institutions became strategic targets. Attacking schools allowed insurgents to attract international attention, demonstrate the government’s inability to protect citizens, and recruit or indoctrinate young people. Students, particularly girls, became valuable tools for propaganda, forced marriages, and political bargaining.

Through these attacks, Boko Haram sought not only to spread fear but also to discourage participation in formal education altogether.The most famous example of this strategy occurred on April 14, 2014, when Boko Haram militants attacked Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State. While students were preparing for examinations, 276 girls were abducted and taken into insurgent-controlled territory.

The incident sparked outrage across Nigeria and around the world, giving rise to the global #BringBackOurGirls campaign. Although many of the girls have since escaped or been released through negotiations and military efforts, dozens remain missing years later. The Chibok abduction became a symbol of the vulnerability of schools in conflict zones and demonstrated how extremist groups could use schoolchildren to gain international attention and political leverage.A similar incident occurred four years later in Dapchi, Yobe State.

Iin February 2018, fighters from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a faction that split from Boko Haram, kidnapped 110 students from a government girls’ school. Unlike the Chibok incident, most of the girls were released within weeks. However, one student, Leah Sharibu, remained in captivity after reportedly refusing to renounce her Christian faith. Her case highlighted the religious and sectarian dimensions that continue to influence some attacks on schools and demonstrated how ideological motivations remain deeply embedded within certain insurgent movements

.While extremist violence dominated headlines during the first phase of the crisis, a new threat emerged after 2018. Across Nigeria’s Northwest and parts of the North-Central region, heavily armed criminal groups commonly referred to as bandits began targeting schools.

Unlike Boko Haram, these groups are primarily motivated by financial gain rather than ideology. For them, schools represent attractive opportunities because they contain large numbers of vulnerable victims whose families, communities, and governments may be willing to pay significant sums for their release.This shift transformed student kidnapping into a profitable criminal enterprise. Boarding schools became especially vulnerable because hundreds of students often reside in one location with limited security.

Criminal groups discovered that by abducting dozens of children at once, they could maximize pressure on authorities and families while increasing potential ransom payments. As a result, school kidnappings evolved into a business model sustained by fear, weak security structures, and the desperation of affected communities.Niger State became one of the regions most affected by this trend.

In February 2021, armed men attacked Government Science College in Kagara, killing a student and abducting dozens of students and staff members. Just a few months later, another large-scale kidnapping occurred at Salihu Tanko Islamic School in Tegina, where approximately 136 children were taken captive. Unlike attacks carried out by extremist groups, these incidents were largely driven by economic motives. The objective was not to challenge educational values but to generate profit through ransom payments.A key factor enabling both insurgents and bandits is the presence of vast forested areas across northern Nigeria.

Forests such as Sambisa, Kamuku, and Rugu provide natural hideouts where armed groups can train, plan operations, and hold abducted victims. These remote areas are difficult to monitor and often lie beyond the effective reach of security forces. The forests function as safe havens that allow criminal and extremist groups to evade capture while launching attacks on nearby communities and schools.The impact of these attacks on education has been devastating. Thousands of children have missed months or even years of schooling. Many parents, fearing for their children’s safety, have withdrawn them from school altogether. Some states have closed boarding schools in high-risk areas, disrupting education for entire communities.

Beyond the immediate loss of learning, survivors often experience severe psychological trauma that affects their ability to return to normal academic life. Teachers, too, face increased risks, making it difficult to recruit and retain qualified personnel in vulnerable regions.The Nigerian government has responded through a combination of military operations, policy initiatives, and community-based approaches.

Following the Chibok abduction, the Safe Schools Initiative was launched to improve security infrastructure and emergency preparedness in schools. Military campaigns have targeted insurgent and bandit camps, while local vigilante groups have been mobilized to assist security agencies in some states. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain, including inadequate funding, corruption, difficult terrain, and the limited capacity of security institutions to protect thousands of schools spread across vast rural areas.

Addressing the crisis requires more than military action alone. Schools must be physically secured through improved fencing, surveillance systems, communication networks, and trained security personnel. At the same time, long-term solutions must tackle the root causes of insecurity, including poverty, unemployment, and the marginalization of rural communities. Efforts to improve trust in formal education, while respecting local cultural and religious values, can also reduce the appeal of extremist narratives.

Furthermore, survivors of abduction and violence need sustained psychological support and educational opportunities to rebuild their lives.The story of insecurity in Nigeria’s education sector is ultimately a story of faith, fear, and forests. Faith represents the ideological beliefs that motivate extremist attacks on education. Fear reflects the psychological weapon used by both insurgents and criminals to disrupt learning and intimidate communities. Forests symbolize the physical spaces that enable these groups to operate beyond the reach of the state.

Understanding the relationship between these three elements is essential for developing effective solutions. Protecting schools is not simply a security challenge; it is an investment in Nigeria’s future. Without safe learning environments, the country’s hopes for development, stability, and prosperity will remain under threat.

Shemudara Blessing Morayo is a graduate of Veritas University Bwari, Abuja, and she’s currently serving as an NYSC Corper at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). She can be reached via shemudarablessing2002@gmail.com

Opinion

NAHCON’s New Hajj Guidelines Signal Shift Towards Tighter Regulation

Published

on

By

By Ibrahim Muhammad

The introduction of new licensing and operational guidelines by the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) signals a broader push to strengthen regulation of private Hajj and Umrah operators and improve accountability, service delivery and consumer protection.

The reforms come amid similar regulatory efforts in countries including Pakistan and Indonesia, where authorities have introduced stricter licensing, financial controls and operational requirements for private pilgrimage operators.

The guidelines are expected to address concerns over service standards, financial transparency and the activities of unlicensed operators in Nigeria’s Hajj and Umrah industry. In Pakistan, recent reforms require private Hajj operators to meet financial and corporate governance standards, undergo performance reviews and operate through a central digital platform for pilgrim registration, payments and quota management.

The framework also requires operators to meet minimum operational thresholds and comply with service agreements covering areas such as accommodation, transportation, medical support, refunds and consumer protection. Indonesia, meanwhile, requires private Hajj operators to obtain regulatory approval for proposed package costs and meet government standards on pricing and service delivery.

These developments point to a wider shift towards digital accountability, financial transparency and stronger oversight of private pilgrimage services. As NAHCON implements its new framework, stakeholders will be watching to see whether it improves service delivery, curbs unlicensed operations, promotes fair competition and creates a more sustainable environment for legitimate Hajj and Umrah operators.

Ibrahim Muhammad is the National Coordinator of Independence Hajj Reporters (IHR).

Part Two will examine the reforms and their implications for Nigeria’s private Hajj and Umrah industry.

Continue Reading

Opinion

Insecurity and 2027: Can Nigerians Vote Safely?

Published

on

By

By Shemudara Blessing Morayo

As Nigeria prepares for the 2027 general elections, concerns about insecurity have become central to discussions about democratic governance. Elections provide citizens with the opportunity to choose their leaders through a free, fair and credible process. However, the ability of Nigerians to exercise this constitutional right depends largely on whether voters, electoral officials and security personnel can participate without fear of violence or intimidation.

Nigeria’s security challenges have become increasingly complex over the past decade. The country continues to face insurgency in the North-East, banditry and kidnapping in the North-West, farmer-herder conflicts in parts of the North-Central, separatist agitations and attacks on public institutions in the South-East, as well as piracy, militancy and other criminal activities in the Niger Delta. Rising urban crime also poses challenges in several major cities.These overlapping threats have displaced communities, disrupted livelihoods and strained the capacity of security agencies. In some areas, insecurity has also affected education, healthcare and civic participation, raising concerns about the organisation of peaceful elections.

Electoral violence has historically been a recurring feature of Nigeria’s democratic experience. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, some elections have been marred by voter intimidation, destruction of electoral materials, attacks on polling units and clashes between political supporters.

Although reforms by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), including the use of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and electronic transmission of results, have strengthened aspects of the electoral process, technology alone cannot guarantee peaceful elections. Security remains fundamental to electoral credibility.One major concern ahead of 2027 is voter turnout. Citizens in conflict-affected communities may be reluctant to visit polling centres because of fears of attacks, kidnapping or violent confrontations. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have also faced difficulties exercising their voting rights after being forced from their communities.

If insecurity persists, significant numbers of eligible voters could be unable or unwilling to participate, potentially affecting the inclusiveness and legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Democracy depends on broad participation, and any situation that discourages citizens from voting poses a threat to democratic consolidation.

The safety of electoral officials is another critical concern. Election administrators, ad hoc staff and logistics personnel are responsible for transporting sensitive materials and conducting elections across thousands of polling units. Insecurity can make these activities particularly difficult in remote and conflict-prone areas.

Delays, cancellations or suspension of voting in affected communities could increase political tensions and fuel allegations of voter suppression or electoral manipulation. This makes effective security planning essential. Political actors must also play their part. The use of armed groups, political thugs and criminal networks during election periods has historically contributed to violence. Hate speech, misinformation and inflammatory rhetoric can further deepen political divisions.

As political campaigns for the 2027 elections intensify, political parties and candidates must adhere to electoral laws, respect democratic norms and discourage their supporters from engaging in violence. Peaceful elections require not only effective security institutions but also responsible political leadership.The role of security agencies will be decisive. The Nigeria Police Force, Armed Forces, Department of State Services, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and other relevant institutions must work together to protect voters, electoral personnel and infrastructure before, during and after the elections. Their responsibilities should include intelligence gathering, threat assessment, crowd management and the protection of electoral facilities.

Professionalism, impartiality and respect for human rights will also be essential to maintaining public confidence in security operations. INEC must equally strengthen collaboration with security agencies and other stakeholders. Early risk assessments, contingency planning and sustained engagement with local communities can help reduce vulnerabilities in areas prone to violence.

Civil society organisations, religious leaders, traditional rulers, youth groups and the media also have important roles to play. Through voter education, peacebuilding, fact-checking and responsible reporting, these stakeholders can help counter misinformation and encourage peaceful participation.Technology presents both opportunities and challenges for election security. While digital innovations have improved aspects of voter accreditation and result management, social media platforms can also facilitate the rapid spread of misinformation and inflammatory content.

Unverified information circulating during elections can create panic and trigger unrest, particularly in communities already affected by insecurity. Government institutions, civil society organisations and technology companies should therefore promote digital literacy, fact-checking and responsible online engagement while respecting freedom of expression.

Whether Nigerians can vote safely in 2027 will ultimately depend on the willingness of all stakeholders to address insecurity proactively. Security agencies need adequate funding, training, equipment and intelligence capabilities to respond effectively to evolving threats.

Political leaders must prioritise national stability over partisan interests, while citizens should reject electoral violence and demand accountability from those seeking public office. Beyond election security, long-term investments in good governance, education, youth employment, poverty reduction and justice sector reforms are also necessary to address some of the structural conditions that contribute to insecurity.

Insecurity remains one of the major threats to Nigeria’s democratic future as the country approaches the 2027 general elections. However, the challenges are not insurmountable.Through coordinated security operations, credible electoral administration, responsible political conduct, active civic participation and sustained institutional reforms, Nigeria can create an environment where citizens are able to participate freely and safely in the democratic process.

The success of the 2027 elections should not be measured solely by the declaration of winners. It should also be judged by the extent to which eligible Nigerians can exercise their right to vote without fear. Ensuring electoral security is therefore not merely a security objective; it is a democratic imperative that will shape Nigeria’s political stability and democratic legitimacy for years to come.

Shemudara Blessing Morayo is a graduate of Veritas University, Bwari, Abuja, and is currently serving as a National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) member at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). She can be reached at [shemudarablessing2002@gmail.com](mailto:shemudarablessing2002@gmail.com).

Continue Reading

Opinion

ACF: We’ve Northerners Who Are Igbos- Prof. Muh’d- Baba Reveals

Published

on

By

…As forum recounts real reasons in crisis

…Alleges leadership control, administrative mistakes, others

By Kaduna Correspondent

As the raging disputes in the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the socio-cultural umbrella organization of northern Nigeria, has continue to deepened, allegations of leadership control tussle, administrative breaches, and mismanagement of about ₦4 billion endowment fund, amongst other reasons, have been enumerated.In this interview with our Kaduna State Correspondent, Gabriel Udeh, the National Publicity Secretary of the ACF, Prof. Tukur Muhammad-Baba, a retired professor of sociology, broke silence on the internal wrangling that recently led to the sealing of the Forum’s headquarters by police in kaduna.

Prof. Muhammad-Baba traced the crisis to attempts to usurp the powers of the National Executive Committee (NEC), disputes over tenure, and violation of the ACF constitution in the management of the Fund. He also spoke on the status of the suspended Board of Trustees Chairman, Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, and the Forum’s position on insecurity in the North. Excerpts:

Q: Let’s know you fully and your position Sir?

A: Okay, I am Tukur Muhammad-Baba. I am a retired university lecturer. I am a scholar for life. That is, I am a professor of sociology. I was the former dean of the Faculty of Social and Management Sciences at the Federal University of Technology, Minna, among others, just before I retired. But basically, I am Tukur Muhammad-Baba. Currently, National Publicity Secretary of the Arewa Consultative Forum. I am a scholar by calling and a sociologist. Thank you so much.

Q: ACF is one of the most respected organizations in Nigeria. There are serious concerns about the recent crisis that went viral and led to police invasion. What are the real reasons ACF is neck deep in this crisis?

A: ACF is a foremost socio-cultural organization in the country. One reason it has retained credibility is because it is not ethnic-based, not religious-based. It’s political, but not partisan. We consult among various groups in the north to come up with a platform of common interest – roads, education, economic development. The north has over 300 ethnic groups. We are united by geography and sociology. For example, in Benue and in Kogi states, we have northerners who are Igbo. In Kwara state, we have northerners who are Yoruba. They are indigenous to the area. But like every modern organization, conflict is inevitable. It is how you handle disagreement that defines the organization. We’ve had personality differences over the years. If you ask me to summarize, the bone of contention is not so much ACF, it’s control of the ACF. Unprecedentedly, individuals emerged and want to control this organization in their own image. During the 25th anniversary, we launched an endowment fund for the first time because we realized there was too much political interference with governors’ contributions. The target was ₦100 billion. Pledges were about ₦7 billion, out of which a little less than ₦4 billion was generated.

Q: What exactly went wrong with the management of that fund?

A: The constitution is clear. There are five organs: Patrons, General Assembly, Board of Trustees, NEC, and NWC. NEC and NWC are the management. BoT is to advise and oversee. There has been a persistent attempt to usurp NEC’s powers by a functionary of BoT, in particular the then chairman, who assumed functions outside the constitution. The fund was moved out of Kaduna, against the constitution which says management must be at the head office. It was moved to a financial institution in Kano offering 8%. We had institutions offering 20% and 21%. By our calculation, we would have earned about ₦113 million in three months at 21%, but at 8% we earned just over ₦17 million. We also discovered part of the money was moved from one bank branch to another where an individual had a personal account, without EXCO approval, without the financial secretary or treasurer.

Q: There is also the issue of tenure of officers and leadership. What happened?

A: The constitution says the Secretary-General serves three years, renewable once. In 2023 there was a lacuna of 6-9 months with no NWC. The ex-Secretary-General continued. His letter of appointment for the second term said tenure begins from inauguration. But BoT said no, he had overstayed. Legal experts said the interim period cannot count. NEC was sidelined. We read in the papers that the SG was asked to go. Nobody wrote to NEC. The Leadership Selection Committee, which is ad hoc, had been in place for nine years. We told them they stood dissolved. They refused

.Q: The crisis led to the headquarters being sealed by police. How did that happen?

A: Disagreement over interpretation led some to invite police to seal the headquarters. It had never happened before. I told the media: when the police get bored of staying at the gate, they will leave. And within 10 days, they left. EXCO had to meet elsewhere. The chairman of BoT also intervened and said nobody should come to the meeting, but he has no power to do that under the constitution.

Q: What about Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, the BoT Chairman? Is he still in office?

A: A petition was received that he was interfering in functions not his, moving money, and directing staff. The Code of Conduct Committee invited him. He refused to appear. The committee recommended suspension and forensic audit. EXCO endorsed it. Bashir Dalhatu was suspended as a member of ACF. By implication, he cannot be BoT Chairman because only a member can hold that position. The BoT should have appointed a new chairman. He has continued to act as if he is CEO. As of now, Bashir Dalhatu is not a member of ACF. He is a suspended member. Any action he takes as chairman is null and void.

Q: Some people are calling it fraud. Is it fraud or administrative mistake?

A: Fraud can only be established by proper investigation. It is under investigation. There is a forensic review going on. The Code of Conduct and Ethics Committee is still waiting to hear from those accused. What I can say now is there have been serious administrative lapses that violate the ACF Constitution. The money shouldn’t have been moved. The organization is losing money by keeping it at 8% instead of 20%. Whether there is fraud or not will be established after investigations.

Q: What is ACF’s position on the rising insecurity in the North?

A: Government seems more interested in politics than security. The most existential threat to Nigeria is insecurity: kidnapping, banditry, rape, inter-communal clashes. It’s not a question of capacity. Our armed forces are trained in the best military colleges worldwide. We think it’s a question of political will. Governors are chief security officers but have no control over police or military deployment. That’s a serious lacuna. We are also not in support of amnesty without accountability. You cannot have your sister raped and government surrenders your right to justice. We must decapitate these criminals and their enablers.

Q: Are there efforts to resolve the crisis?

A: Yes. Elders are intervening. Lawyers have submitted legal positions. We are hoping it will be resolved soon because the North needs to articulate its position within Nigeria. When we are united, ACF has been impactful. We reviewed the four tax bills and 80% of our recommendations were reflected. We galvanized opposition to military intervention in Niger Republic and to foreign military bases in Nigeria. Our position is simple:let everybody abide by the provisions of the constitution.

Continue Reading

Trending

Copyright © 2017 Zox News Theme. Theme by MVP Themes, powered by WordPress.