Opinion
The CPC @105: Lessons for African Development and Political Leadership
By Amjad M. Nyei
I studied in China from 2008 to 2016, attending universities in Jiangxi and Hubei Provinces—two regions closely associated with the Chinese Revolution that ultimately gave birth to the People’s Republic of China. Those eight years were both academically enriching and personally transformative. I witnessed firsthand the deep sense of patriotism among the Chinese people, as well as the respect they generally accorded to their governing institutions. Many of my classmates were committed members of the Communist Party of China (CPC) or actively participated in Party-related activities. The CPC’s presence was visible throughout university campuses. Red banners displaying educational slogans were common sights, carrying messages such as, “China’s Civilization Starts with Me,” “At the national level: Democracy, Civility, and Harmony; at the social level: Freedom, Equality, and Justice; at the individual level: Dedication, Integrity, and Friendliness.” These slogans constantly reminded citizens of their civic responsibilities while reinforcing the government’s commitment to national development and social cohesion.
One memorable experience during my stay in China was the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China at Nanchang University. The entire campus was filled with excitement, pride, and patriotism. Students devoted countless hours to rehearsing for the university’s grand gala, eager to contribute to the national celebration. On the evening of the event, the atmosphere was electric. The audience was treated to breathtaking cultural dances, moving poetry recitals, and theatrical performances depicting key moments of the Chinese Revolution. It was more than a celebration of history; it was a powerful expression of national identity and collective purpose. Witnessing such a profound display of unity and patriotism gave me a deeper appreciation of the values that have shaped modern China and continue to influence its remarkable development.
A party committed to state and its people has been diligently carrying out its responsibilities in spite numerous competing priorities.
A brief Historical Context and Modern Realities
The Chinese Communist Party (CPC) is the largest and one of the most powerful political organizations in the world and has played a crucial role in initiating most of the major reforms in China, especially during the period after 1970. Political party system is imported to China; the CPC is a Chinese cultural product: it is an entirely different breed of political party from those in the West. However, since the 1970s, reforms and open-door policy, the CPC has been enabled to accommodate various elements of democracy. This is termed, democracy with Chinese characteristics.
Founded in 1921 in the eastern Chinese city of Shanghai, the CPC has gone through dramatic transformation in its century of existence. With an initial membership of 53 people, the party has survived the political onslaughts of the KTM in the 1920s and 1930s and expanded drastically in subsequent decades1. Under the astute leadership of leadership Mao Zedong, the CPC became the ruling party of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.
The party can be credited for unification and sovereignty of the China- ending the decades-long warlordism and civil war; established a centralized state controlling the mainland. The CPC has pushed for institutional continuity- building durable party-state institutions, including, party committees, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the bureaucracy which has governed a population over a billion for seven plus decades. More importantly asserting territorial integration has been of major achievement of the party, integrating (e.g., Tibet and Xinjiang) into the PRC control and negotiated the return of Hon Kong and Macau in 1997 and 1999 respectively.
Meanwhile, economic and transformation and development, as well as science and technology innovation has been on the double in China, all thanks to the intentional plans and reforms of the CPC. China has sustained rapid GDP growth and poverty reduction orchestrated through high-growth policies since the late 1970s that lifted hundreds of millions out of extreme poverty. Industrialization and urbanization coupled with infrastructure built out has been strongly emphasised and implemented through competent structures of the CPC. China’s development journey is inseparable from the Party’s leadership. Over the past century, the Party has consistently renewed and strengthened itself, enabling it to lead the Chinese people through revolutions, construction and reform, and to usher in the historic achievements and transformations of the new era.
The CPC in 1921 vs the CPC in 2026: a Journey in Time
The Communist Party of China (CPC) has undergone one of the most remarkable transformations in modern political history. Organised by a small group of intellectuals and revolutionaries, the Party emerged during a period of profound national crisis characterized by political fragmentation, foreign intervention, and socioeconomic instability. With fewer than one hundred members at its inception, the CPC was primarily concerned with promoting Marxist ideology and mobilizing support for revolutionary change. Its early years were marked by political struggle, organizational development, and efforts to establish itself as a viable force within a rapidly changing China.
By contrast, the CPC of 2026 stands is the governing party of the People’s Republic of China and one of the largest political organizations in the world, with a membership exceeding one hundred million. Over the course of a century of existence, the Party evolved from an underground revolutionary movement into a highly institutionalized governing body responsible for administering the affairs of a nation of more than 1.4 billion people. Through successive historical phases—including the revolutionary era, socialist construction, reform and opening-up, and modernization—the CPC has adapted its policies and structures to address changing domestic and international realities while maintaining its central leadership role.
The differences between the CPC of 1921 and that of 2026 extend beyond scale and political influence. The Party’s principal objective in 1921 was the pursuit of revolutionary transformation and the overthrow of existing political structures. In 2026, however, its responsibilities encompass economic management, technological innovation, environmental sustainability, social governance, national security, and international affairs. China’s emergence as a major global economic and diplomatic actor has significantly expanded the Party’s role, requiring it to navigate complex challenges associated with globalization, development, and geopolitical competition.
Despite these profound changes, certain elements of continuity remain evident throughout the CPC’s historical journey. The Party continues to emphasize national development, political stability, and the pursuit of long-term strategic goals. While the CPC of 1921 sought to transform China through revolution, the CPC of 2026 seeks to advance national rejuvenation through governance and modernization. The century-long evolution from a small gathering of revolutionary activists to the leadership of a global power illustrates not only the adaptability of the Party but also the broader transformation of China itself, making the CPC’s development one of the most significant political narratives of modern times.
Western scholarship False Prediction of the CPC
A substantial body of Western political science literature has, at different intervals, forecasted the potential collapse or fragmentation of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Among the most cited voices in this baseless discourse are Gordon G. Chang, David Shambaugh, Roderick MacFarquhar, and Susan Shirk. Though differing in analytical depth and predictive certainty, their works collectively reflect a recurring “fragility thesis” in China studies—namely, that the structural contradictions of governance, economic imbalance, and elite political stress could culminate in regime breakdown. Gordon G. Chang’s 2001 argument remains the most direct collapse prediction, asserting that China’s entry into global capitalism would destabilize the Party-state and lead to imminent systemic failure. In contrast, Shambaugh and Shirk adopt more cautious tones, emphasizing erosion, fragility, and governance strain rather than immediate collapse.
David Shambaugh’s 2015 essay “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” argues that the CPC had entered a late-stage decline characterized by ideological decay, elite disunity, pervasive corruption, and diminishing governance capacity. While he later moderated his claims, Shambaugh maintained that the Chinese political model was not guaranteed indefinitely and that internal contradictions could eventually overwhelm institutional control. Susan Shirk similarly highlights the paradox of a strong yet brittle state, arguing that China’s centralized authority coexists with deep structural vulnerabilities, particularly in bureaucratic accountability, corruption control, and crisis responsiveness. Her analysis frames China as a “fragile superpower,” suggesting that external strength may conceal internal institutional stress. In today’s China, however, it is difficult that these arguments would be sustained. There has been massive improvement in the fight against corruption since President Xi took the helm of power in China. The Party has disciplined millions of officials and high-ranking elites to ensure the elimination of institutional graft. China has the quickest crisis responsiveness amongst the UNSC members. The 2008 devastating earthquake in Sichuan and the rapid response to the 2020 COVID-19 virus are evidence of China preparedness to combat challenges both at home and abroad. This speaks contrarily to Western criticism.
Another western writer on the issue is Roderick MacFarquhar. His contributions are more historical and structural than predictive, focusing on elite politics, ideological struggle, and the volatility of Maoist governance—especially during the Cultural Revolution period. His work underscores how factionalism, ideological radicalism, and leadership instability have historically threatened systemic coherence within the CPC. While MacFarquhar does not explicitly predict imminent collapse, his analysis of recurring elite conflict and ideological turbulence is often incorporated into broader arguments about regime fragility and potential systemic breakdown.
Despite these influential arguments, the contemporary reality of China in 2026 presents a striking counterpoint. Far from collapse, the CPC remains the central governing institution of a highly consolidated political system and the steward of the world’s second-largest economy. China has achieved sustained industrial upgrading, technological advancement in sectors such as artificial intelligence and green energy and expanded global economic influence through initiatives such as the Belt and Road framework. Politically, the CPC has strengthened internal discipline through extensive anti-corruption campaigns and reinforced centralized leadership under President Xi Jinping. Globally, China has emerged as a major strategic actor shaping trade networks, infrastructure investment, and multilateral diplomacy. This trajectory does not suggest systemic fragmentation, but adaptive resilience and institutional consolidation.
The juxtaposition between collapse-oriented scholarship and China’s contemporary trajectory highlights a central tension in political discourse: the difficulty of projecting the party-state durability systems undergoing rapid transformation. The CPC’s continued survival and expansion of state capacity suggest a more glaring reality- i.e., the purposeful leadership and rejuvenation agenda of the party and government. Rather than collapsing under internal contradictions, the Chinese political system has demonstrated a capacity for adaptation, institutional learning, and reform. This divergence between prediction and outcome underscores the importance of distinguishing between structural vulnerability and actual regime performance in comparative political analysis.
Lesson for African Development and Political Leadership
The developmental track record of the Communist Party OF China (CPC) offers a significant comparative reference for understanding state-led transformation in the Global South. From its emergence in 1921 to its consolidation of power and subsequent economic reforms, the CPC has demonstrated how long-term political continuity can shape developmental outcomes. For many African states, which continue to grapple with colonial legacies, institutional fragility, and uneven economic growth, China’s experience presents both an analytical model and a policy reference point. Scholars of comparative politics often highlight the importance of governance structures in explaining divergent development paths between East Asia and Africa.
A central lesson from the Chinese experience is the role of state capacity and political stability in enabling sustained development. The CPC has maintained a strong, centralized governing structure capable of implementing long-term development strategies with relatively high policy continuity. This has allowed China to pursue infrastructure expansion, industrialization, and poverty alleviation programs over multiple decades without major disruption. In contrast, many African countries face challenges of policy discontinuity due to electoral turnover, bureaucratic inefficiency, and political instability, and most recently, the wave of military takeovers. All of these put together hinder long-term planning and implementation. Strengthening institutions that ensure continuity in development planning may therefore be a critical priority for governance systems in Africa.
Another important lesson lies in China’s strategic use of state-led market reforms. Rather than adopting a rapid transition to liberal market capitalism, the CPC implemented gradual economic reforms under strong political control, particularly after 1978. This hybrid model enabled China to integrate into the global economy while maintaining domestic political stability and directing investment toward priority sectors such as infrastructure, manufacturing, and technology. For African economies, this suggests that selective state intervention—particularly in strategic sectors—may complement private sector development rather than oppose it. However, such an approach requires effective institutions, competent bureaucracy, and mechanisms to reduce corruption and inefficiency.
In conclusion, the Communist Party of China experience offers both practical insights and normative challenges for African development and political leadership. It underscores the importance of political stability, strategic planning, and strong state institutions in achieving sustained economic transformation. Contrary to West political thoughts and arguments, the CPC has no internal risk of collapse but strong well and determination to provide the basic needs for the state and people. For Africa, the most productive lesson is not imitation of the Chinese model, but the selective adaptation of its developmental strengths in ways that align with local political realities and democratic aspirations. This 105th anniversary of the CPC, come with greater opportunity for broader cooperation and for China-Africa cooperation within the framework of FOCAC and the Belt and Road Initiative.
Long live the CPC and the People of China.
Amjad M. Nyei is a China-trained scholar
Opinion
NAHCON’s New Hajj Guidelines Signal Shift Towards Tighter Regulation
By Ibrahim Muhammad
The introduction of new licensing and operational guidelines by the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) signals a broader push to strengthen regulation of private Hajj and Umrah operators and improve accountability, service delivery and consumer protection.
The reforms come amid similar regulatory efforts in countries including Pakistan and Indonesia, where authorities have introduced stricter licensing, financial controls and operational requirements for private pilgrimage operators.
The guidelines are expected to address concerns over service standards, financial transparency and the activities of unlicensed operators in Nigeria’s Hajj and Umrah industry. In Pakistan, recent reforms require private Hajj operators to meet financial and corporate governance standards, undergo performance reviews and operate through a central digital platform for pilgrim registration, payments and quota management.
The framework also requires operators to meet minimum operational thresholds and comply with service agreements covering areas such as accommodation, transportation, medical support, refunds and consumer protection. Indonesia, meanwhile, requires private Hajj operators to obtain regulatory approval for proposed package costs and meet government standards on pricing and service delivery.
These developments point to a wider shift towards digital accountability, financial transparency and stronger oversight of private pilgrimage services. As NAHCON implements its new framework, stakeholders will be watching to see whether it improves service delivery, curbs unlicensed operations, promotes fair competition and creates a more sustainable environment for legitimate Hajj and Umrah operators.
Ibrahim Muhammad is the National Coordinator of Independence Hajj Reporters (IHR).
Part Two will examine the reforms and their implications for Nigeria’s private Hajj and Umrah industry.
Opinion
Insecurity and 2027: Can Nigerians Vote Safely?
By Shemudara Blessing Morayo
As Nigeria prepares for the 2027 general elections, concerns about insecurity have become central to discussions about democratic governance. Elections provide citizens with the opportunity to choose their leaders through a free, fair and credible process. However, the ability of Nigerians to exercise this constitutional right depends largely on whether voters, electoral officials and security personnel can participate without fear of violence or intimidation.
Nigeria’s security challenges have become increasingly complex over the past decade. The country continues to face insurgency in the North-East, banditry and kidnapping in the North-West, farmer-herder conflicts in parts of the North-Central, separatist agitations and attacks on public institutions in the South-East, as well as piracy, militancy and other criminal activities in the Niger Delta. Rising urban crime also poses challenges in several major cities.These overlapping threats have displaced communities, disrupted livelihoods and strained the capacity of security agencies. In some areas, insecurity has also affected education, healthcare and civic participation, raising concerns about the organisation of peaceful elections.
Electoral violence has historically been a recurring feature of Nigeria’s democratic experience. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, some elections have been marred by voter intimidation, destruction of electoral materials, attacks on polling units and clashes between political supporters.
Although reforms by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), including the use of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and electronic transmission of results, have strengthened aspects of the electoral process, technology alone cannot guarantee peaceful elections. Security remains fundamental to electoral credibility.One major concern ahead of 2027 is voter turnout. Citizens in conflict-affected communities may be reluctant to visit polling centres because of fears of attacks, kidnapping or violent confrontations. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have also faced difficulties exercising their voting rights after being forced from their communities.
If insecurity persists, significant numbers of eligible voters could be unable or unwilling to participate, potentially affecting the inclusiveness and legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Democracy depends on broad participation, and any situation that discourages citizens from voting poses a threat to democratic consolidation.
The safety of electoral officials is another critical concern. Election administrators, ad hoc staff and logistics personnel are responsible for transporting sensitive materials and conducting elections across thousands of polling units. Insecurity can make these activities particularly difficult in remote and conflict-prone areas.
Delays, cancellations or suspension of voting in affected communities could increase political tensions and fuel allegations of voter suppression or electoral manipulation. This makes effective security planning essential. Political actors must also play their part. The use of armed groups, political thugs and criminal networks during election periods has historically contributed to violence. Hate speech, misinformation and inflammatory rhetoric can further deepen political divisions.
As political campaigns for the 2027 elections intensify, political parties and candidates must adhere to electoral laws, respect democratic norms and discourage their supporters from engaging in violence. Peaceful elections require not only effective security institutions but also responsible political leadership.The role of security agencies will be decisive. The Nigeria Police Force, Armed Forces, Department of State Services, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and other relevant institutions must work together to protect voters, electoral personnel and infrastructure before, during and after the elections. Their responsibilities should include intelligence gathering, threat assessment, crowd management and the protection of electoral facilities.
Professionalism, impartiality and respect for human rights will also be essential to maintaining public confidence in security operations. INEC must equally strengthen collaboration with security agencies and other stakeholders. Early risk assessments, contingency planning and sustained engagement with local communities can help reduce vulnerabilities in areas prone to violence.
Civil society organisations, religious leaders, traditional rulers, youth groups and the media also have important roles to play. Through voter education, peacebuilding, fact-checking and responsible reporting, these stakeholders can help counter misinformation and encourage peaceful participation.Technology presents both opportunities and challenges for election security. While digital innovations have improved aspects of voter accreditation and result management, social media platforms can also facilitate the rapid spread of misinformation and inflammatory content.
Unverified information circulating during elections can create panic and trigger unrest, particularly in communities already affected by insecurity. Government institutions, civil society organisations and technology companies should therefore promote digital literacy, fact-checking and responsible online engagement while respecting freedom of expression.
Whether Nigerians can vote safely in 2027 will ultimately depend on the willingness of all stakeholders to address insecurity proactively. Security agencies need adequate funding, training, equipment and intelligence capabilities to respond effectively to evolving threats.
Political leaders must prioritise national stability over partisan interests, while citizens should reject electoral violence and demand accountability from those seeking public office. Beyond election security, long-term investments in good governance, education, youth employment, poverty reduction and justice sector reforms are also necessary to address some of the structural conditions that contribute to insecurity.
Insecurity remains one of the major threats to Nigeria’s democratic future as the country approaches the 2027 general elections. However, the challenges are not insurmountable.Through coordinated security operations, credible electoral administration, responsible political conduct, active civic participation and sustained institutional reforms, Nigeria can create an environment where citizens are able to participate freely and safely in the democratic process.
The success of the 2027 elections should not be measured solely by the declaration of winners. It should also be judged by the extent to which eligible Nigerians can exercise their right to vote without fear. Ensuring electoral security is therefore not merely a security objective; it is a democratic imperative that will shape Nigeria’s political stability and democratic legitimacy for years to come.
Shemudara Blessing Morayo is a graduate of Veritas University, Bwari, Abuja, and is currently serving as a National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) member at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). She can be reached at [shemudarablessing2002@gmail.com](mailto:shemudarablessing2002@gmail.com).
Opinion
ACF: We’ve Northerners Who Are Igbos- Prof. Muh’d- Baba Reveals
…As forum recounts real reasons in crisis
…Alleges leadership control, administrative mistakes, others
By Kaduna Correspondent
As the raging disputes in the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the socio-cultural umbrella organization of northern Nigeria, has continue to deepened, allegations of leadership control tussle, administrative breaches, and mismanagement of about ₦4 billion endowment fund, amongst other reasons, have been enumerated.In this interview with our Kaduna State Correspondent, Gabriel Udeh, the National Publicity Secretary of the ACF, Prof. Tukur Muhammad-Baba, a retired professor of sociology, broke silence on the internal wrangling that recently led to the sealing of the Forum’s headquarters by police in kaduna.
Prof. Muhammad-Baba traced the crisis to attempts to usurp the powers of the National Executive Committee (NEC), disputes over tenure, and violation of the ACF constitution in the management of the Fund. He also spoke on the status of the suspended Board of Trustees Chairman, Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, and the Forum’s position on insecurity in the North. Excerpts:
Q: Let’s know you fully and your position Sir?
A: Okay, I am Tukur Muhammad-Baba. I am a retired university lecturer. I am a scholar for life. That is, I am a professor of sociology. I was the former dean of the Faculty of Social and Management Sciences at the Federal University of Technology, Minna, among others, just before I retired. But basically, I am Tukur Muhammad-Baba. Currently, National Publicity Secretary of the Arewa Consultative Forum. I am a scholar by calling and a sociologist. Thank you so much.
Q: ACF is one of the most respected organizations in Nigeria. There are serious concerns about the recent crisis that went viral and led to police invasion. What are the real reasons ACF is neck deep in this crisis?
A: ACF is a foremost socio-cultural organization in the country. One reason it has retained credibility is because it is not ethnic-based, not religious-based. It’s political, but not partisan. We consult among various groups in the north to come up with a platform of common interest – roads, education, economic development. The north has over 300 ethnic groups. We are united by geography and sociology. For example, in Benue and in Kogi states, we have northerners who are Igbo. In Kwara state, we have northerners who are Yoruba. They are indigenous to the area. But like every modern organization, conflict is inevitable. It is how you handle disagreement that defines the organization. We’ve had personality differences over the years. If you ask me to summarize, the bone of contention is not so much ACF, it’s control of the ACF. Unprecedentedly, individuals emerged and want to control this organization in their own image. During the 25th anniversary, we launched an endowment fund for the first time because we realized there was too much political interference with governors’ contributions. The target was ₦100 billion. Pledges were about ₦7 billion, out of which a little less than ₦4 billion was generated.
Q: What exactly went wrong with the management of that fund?
A: The constitution is clear. There are five organs: Patrons, General Assembly, Board of Trustees, NEC, and NWC. NEC and NWC are the management. BoT is to advise and oversee. There has been a persistent attempt to usurp NEC’s powers by a functionary of BoT, in particular the then chairman, who assumed functions outside the constitution. The fund was moved out of Kaduna, against the constitution which says management must be at the head office. It was moved to a financial institution in Kano offering 8%. We had institutions offering 20% and 21%. By our calculation, we would have earned about ₦113 million in three months at 21%, but at 8% we earned just over ₦17 million. We also discovered part of the money was moved from one bank branch to another where an individual had a personal account, without EXCO approval, without the financial secretary or treasurer.
Q: There is also the issue of tenure of officers and leadership. What happened?
A: The constitution says the Secretary-General serves three years, renewable once. In 2023 there was a lacuna of 6-9 months with no NWC. The ex-Secretary-General continued. His letter of appointment for the second term said tenure begins from inauguration. But BoT said no, he had overstayed. Legal experts said the interim period cannot count. NEC was sidelined. We read in the papers that the SG was asked to go. Nobody wrote to NEC. The Leadership Selection Committee, which is ad hoc, had been in place for nine years. We told them they stood dissolved. They refused
.Q: The crisis led to the headquarters being sealed by police. How did that happen?
A: Disagreement over interpretation led some to invite police to seal the headquarters. It had never happened before. I told the media: when the police get bored of staying at the gate, they will leave. And within 10 days, they left. EXCO had to meet elsewhere. The chairman of BoT also intervened and said nobody should come to the meeting, but he has no power to do that under the constitution.
Q: What about Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, the BoT Chairman? Is he still in office?
A: A petition was received that he was interfering in functions not his, moving money, and directing staff. The Code of Conduct Committee invited him. He refused to appear. The committee recommended suspension and forensic audit. EXCO endorsed it. Bashir Dalhatu was suspended as a member of ACF. By implication, he cannot be BoT Chairman because only a member can hold that position. The BoT should have appointed a new chairman. He has continued to act as if he is CEO. As of now, Bashir Dalhatu is not a member of ACF. He is a suspended member. Any action he takes as chairman is null and void.
Q: Some people are calling it fraud. Is it fraud or administrative mistake?
A: Fraud can only be established by proper investigation. It is under investigation. There is a forensic review going on. The Code of Conduct and Ethics Committee is still waiting to hear from those accused. What I can say now is there have been serious administrative lapses that violate the ACF Constitution. The money shouldn’t have been moved. The organization is losing money by keeping it at 8% instead of 20%. Whether there is fraud or not will be established after investigations.
Q: What is ACF’s position on the rising insecurity in the North?
A: Government seems more interested in politics than security. The most existential threat to Nigeria is insecurity: kidnapping, banditry, rape, inter-communal clashes. It’s not a question of capacity. Our armed forces are trained in the best military colleges worldwide. We think it’s a question of political will. Governors are chief security officers but have no control over police or military deployment. That’s a serious lacuna. We are also not in support of amnesty without accountability. You cannot have your sister raped and government surrenders your right to justice. We must decapitate these criminals and their enablers.
Q: Are there efforts to resolve the crisis?
A: Yes. Elders are intervening. Lawyers have submitted legal positions. We are hoping it will be resolved soon because the North needs to articulate its position within Nigeria. When we are united, ACF has been impactful. We reviewed the four tax bills and 80% of our recommendations were reflected. We galvanized opposition to military intervention in Niger Republic and to foreign military bases in Nigeria. Our position is simple:let everybody abide by the provisions of the constitution.
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